Senior Chinese Official Criticizes U.S. bilaterals on Doha, Sees No Room to Meet

Daily News - Sunday, November 29, 2009
 
Senior Chinese Official Criticizes U.S. Bilaterals On Doha, Sees No Room To Meet
 
Geneva -- A senior Chinese official has strongly criticized as ineffective and counterproductive to the multilateral Doha round negotiations a U.S. effort to extract more market access concessions from key countries in bilateral meetings.
 
Chinese Vice Minister for Agriculture Niu Dun said it is his personal view that the bilateral discussions are not an effective means of bridging the remaining gaps in the Doha round, and that the U.S. focus on bilaterals this fall has hampered progress in the multilateral negotiations.
 
“Personally, in my opinion, I don't want to have the bilateral session between [the] USA and China,” said on Nov. 29. “I would like to have the negotiations in the multilateral system because ... that is the main channel to solve the problem.”
 
He also announced he was too busy attending other meetings this week to have a bilateral session with the United States. “This week, I haven't time because I have to participate in G20, G33 meetings, a lot of meetings,” he said, in reference to two coalitions of developing countries of which China is a member.
 
However, he said President Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao discussed the Doha round “a lot” when Obama was in China earlier this month.
 
In a related development, Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim also strongly criticized the United States for its focus on bilateral negotiations on Doha (see related story).
 
China is largely refusing to reveal additional concessions to the U.S. in bilateral meetings because it does not see the Doha round in an “end game” scenario where final trade-offs occur, sources said.
 
The U.S. believes that holding bilateral sessions with key partners such as China, Brazil, India and South Africa is one important way to clarify the value of the gains in the Doha round based on current modalities developed at the July 2008 informal ministerial in Geneva.
 
The U.S. insists that it needs more clarity on market access concessions given the many flexibilities that are open to developing countries under the latest agriculture draft modalities texts.
 
For example, the U.S. would like to clarify how countries such as China will use so-called special product flexibilities, under which developing countries can shield from formula cuts -- and potentially from any cuts whatsoever -- a limited number of agriculture products.
 
But Niu Dun appeared to downplay any possibility that China would be forthcoming with this information in bilateral meetings with the United States, partially because it does not have sufficient information about U.S. concessions.
 
“I also want clarity from the U.S. side, for example on how much subsidies that you provided to your farmers. I really want to know about the specifics of export subsidies [and] domestic support, but you keep that confidential,” he said through an interpreter, when asked if China could provide further information to the U.S. on its use of special products.
 
“Actually, we have been very clear. I don't think there is any room for exchange,” he added, when asked if both the U.S. and China could both provide more information as a compromise.
 
The current draft modalities in both agriculture and non-agricultural market access (NAMA) pose a political dilemma for the Obama administration for two reasons.
 
One is that the Bush administration showed more flexibility in the hope of getting a deal than U.S. stakeholders found acceptable, though the U.S. offers were contingent on other countries making new concessions as well.
 
Second, the U.S. is now under pressure in Geneva to accept these draft modalities as the basis for resuming negotiations on modalities even though it says the other trading partners have not reciprocated with concessions of their own.   
 
To deal with this problem, the U.S. government is now trying to secure specific market access concessions on priority products from key trading partners. The more the U.S. can secure commitments, the easier it will be to defend its acceptance of the pending draft modalities and the harder it will be for U.S. constituents to maintain their opposition to the draft modalities, according to one informed private-sector source.